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TEACHING NOTES

The Conduct of Pacification in Vietnam-Case Study
By Rufus Phillips∗

The purpose of this case as a teaching tool is to familiarize students with issues related to
assisting other countries in stability operations, in meeting the challenges of coordinating
between military and civilian personnel, and in creating interagency teams across the military
and civilian government spectrum. It is also useful in fleshing out some of the issues associated
with force of personality in cooperative leadership and decision-making.

CORDS unified the American pacification effort from top to bottom. The civil-military
advisory teams CORDS created were essential to the success, albeit temporary, of pacification in
Vietnam. So too were two other factors: getting counterinsurgency doctrine right and having it
guide all significant military and civil operations; and having the Vietnamese organized and fully
committed to implementing the theory on the ground. If there was a fault, it concerned not giving
more time and attention to getting the South Vietnamese ready to take over. That, of course,
required a longer period than American domestic politics allowed. The really hard work for the
U.S. in stability and counterinsurgency operations is the transition to full host government
responsibility. This will require the U.S. to keep in mind T. E. Lawrence’s guidance that, “Better
your allies do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to
do it for them.”1 Or as General Abrams put it in 1970, “Sooner or later the Vietnamese
themselves have got to settle this thing. We can only help and we can only help so much.”2

Background
After the fall of Dien Bien Phu in April 1954, the Geneva Accords divided Vietnam at
the 17th Parallel. While the Communist Vietminh consolidated their power over the North,
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French forces evacuated the South. At the same time, the South struggled to survive in the face
of resettling a million refugees fleeing the North, rival religious and gangster sect forces
contending for power, and no control over large swaths of southern territory which had been
under Vietminh rule for over nine years. These territories, along with active combat against sect
forces in Saigon and the Mekong Delta, posed a significant counterinsurgency or pacification3
challenge as the South emerged as an independent republic by the end of 1955. The American
military advisory mission (MAAG), instead of being limited to advising the French, now began
giving direct assistance and advice to the Vietnamese army. The pacification campaign – an
early exercise in civilian-military coordinated counterinsurgency with local government lead –
reveals challenges and lessons for current and future complex operations. Out of the pacification
experience in Vietnam culminating in CORDS lessons can be drawn which are relevant to
Afghanistan and future conflicts.
These lessons include the following. One, it is important to understand and be sensitive
to the critical psychological and political aspects of the struggle, particularly concerning the
standing in the eyes of its own people of the government we are trying to help, and to integrate
U.S. advisory efforts unobtrusively as possible with those of the host government in a joint
approach. (This presents obvious difficulties if we are intervening directly with our own troops
rather than acting as advisors). Two, high quality top American civil and military leadership
must apply a cooperative top to bottom team approach based on a realistic understanding of the
host country’s political vulnerabilities and underlying security and governance problems. Three,
the US and the host government must jointly share the same coherent and coordinated
counterinsurgency doctrine, combined with effective civil-military operations in the field.
Fourth, if U.S. troops are directly involved transition to host country control needs to be
considered from the very beginning. Finally, estimates of progress in stability operations should
rely more on intangible indicators rather than statistical measurements.

TEACHING OBJECTIVES:
1. To understand that strategies and decisions related to counterinsurgency (stability)
operations are not necessarily made in a linear manner.
2. To understand better the complex challenges of effectively helping another country in
conducting counterinsurgency

3. To

appreciate

the

importance

of

civil-military coordination

in

implementing

counterinsurgency and other complex operations.
4. To highlight the importance of learning lessons from past operations.
5. To demonstrate the best practice – and pitfalls – in helping develop effective local
leadership of the process/ program.
6. To understand the challenges of interagency and civilian-military coordination.

TARGET AUDIENCES:
Graduate and post-graduate students in national security affairs, international affairs,
international law, and international development

U.S. government agency officials with national security responsibilities:
o U.S. Department of State
o U.S. Agency for International Development
o U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense
o Central Intelligence Agency
o High-level U.S. military staffs (Joint Staff, regional commands)Civil Affairs Military
Officers
o Civilian-Military Planners
o Army Reserves planning and employment in support of operations

.
ISSUES to CONSIDER AND QUESTIONS TO ASK:
1. How would you define the problems faced by decision makers in this case – what are the
nuances of the problems of insurgency that the pacification campaign sought to address?
2. Could early USG policy and decision makers have more adequately addressed South
Vietnam’s insurgency struggle had they had a better understanding of its underlying
nature and what does that tell us about facing similar problems in other countries?
3. How important to success was the unified advisory approach developed by CORDS and
did it address existing problems? What were the roles of the military and of the civilian
USG experts?

4. Based on the counterinsurgency experience in Vietnam and the ultimate formation of
CORDS, what lessons may be drawn to frame recommendations for policy and decisionmaking applicable to current and future conflict situations
The importance of understanding and being sensitive to the critical psychological and

•

political aspects of counterinsurgency and stability operations.
The value of understanding from the very beginning the importance of host country

•

sustainability.
The importance of integrating U.S. advisory efforts with those of the host government

•

in a joint approach.
The value of a cooperative USG team approach – integrating military and civilian

•

assets.

EXERCISES:
1. Assign groups of three to five students to role play and discuss the views of the
individual and organization assigned to him or her.:
•

Edward G. Lansdale (in his early and later roles)

•

General William Westmoreland

•

General Creighton Abrams

•

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge
• The U.S. Embassy Deputy Chief of Mission (may be more than one to represent

each period)
• Robert Komer
•

William Colby

•

A senior representative of the South Vietnam government responsible for
counterinsurgency

2.

•

A senior representative of the South Vietnam military

•

A representative of the Vietcong insurgency

Task the student groups to answer the following questions:
•

What authority did you or your organization have in this situation? Was it properly
framed, or were you marginalized, left out, or ill-used?

•

What organizational prerogatives did you believe were important for you or your
organization to protect in the interagency process?

•

With which organizations was it necessary or advantageous to cooperate and/or
coordinate?

What was or would have been the most effective means for

coordinating?
What would you have done differently from the real case study?
3.

Allow the student teams a period of time to develop answers to these questions, then have
one of the group answer the questions in such a way that they can be presented to the class.
Do not allow any critique or discussion at this point—just capture the responses.

4.

Now reassign the roles, this time assigning students to organizations to which they showed
the greatest disdain or negativism during the first round. Give the new groups ten minutes to
develop answers to the same questions, and have those answers posted directly under the
comments of the first group for the same organization.

CLASS DISCUSSION
• Review

all

sets

of

comments

for

each

organization,

and

pull

out

consistencies/discrepancies between the different student groups.
• Develop consensus on what were effective and ineffective actions of each group (including

acts of omission and commission).
• Discuss whether difficulties arising from these actions and methods of operation years ago

have been remedied, remain the same, or have grown worse.
Allow students to opine about the best ways to assure adequate implementation of policy
guidance and interagency coordination.
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